"The [NYFed] caved in to demands by [AIG's] trading partners that they be paid in full for complex securities they had insured with the company, saving soem of the world's biggest banks from billions in losses, according to a government audit. ... The banks that were paid off in full included [GSG]. Merrill Lynch and large French banks Societie Generale and Calyon, the investment bank unit of Credit Agricole Group, which were represented by the French bank regulator in negotiations with the [NYFed] last November, the report said. ... The audit provides a window into a bailout effort that has been shrouded by a lack of disclosure--raised in the report--and questions over why the US government in effect funneled tens of billions of dollars to the US and European banks that were AIG's trading partners", my emphasis, Serena Ng & Carrick Mollenkamp at the WSJ, 17 November 2009, link: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704431804574540290325376348.html.
"For more than a year, [GSG] has maintained that it wouldn't have suffered material losses had the government allowed one of its major trading partners, [AIG] to collapse. ... A revamped rescue package in November led to Goldman and 15 other banks being paid in full for $62 billion worth of insurance contracts they had with AIG to protect against losses tied to mortgage assets. ... The government auditor's report broadly fouind that the [NYFed] left itself little room in nogotiating with the banks for a better deal for taxpayers. ... In a separate series of trades, Goldman had sold protection against losses on the same assets to other trading firms. ... Goldman has said it was insulated against a material loss by an AIG default. And the audit pointed our that Goldman in fact was protected against some losses. For example, the firm had collected $8.4 billion worth of collateral--cash or a liquid equivalent--from AIG on a $13.9 billion portion of its bets. Separately, Goldman took steps to try and buy insurance against insurance by purchasing protection against an AIG default. ... The audit said, however, that given the fact that the market for those securities had tanked in November 2008, and then an AIG default would have sparked a rout, Goldman would have had a difficult time obtaining value for those assets. ... The bottom line: The audit said those assets that Goldman held would have been worth a lot less had AIG defaulted. ... The audit also raised questions about the insulation Goldman had purchased against an AIG default", my emphasis, Carrick Mollenkamp and Serena Ng at the WSJ, 18 November 2009, link: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748504538404574542192562568738.html.
"Finally, Mr. Barofsky pokes holes in arguments made repeatedly over the past 14 months by [GSG], AIG's largest trading partner and recipient of $12.9 billion in taxpayer money in the bailiut, that it had facced no material risk in an AIG default--that, in effect, had AIG cratered, [GSG] wouldn't have suffered damage. ... As Goldman prepares to pay out nearly $17 billion in bonuses to its employees in one of its most profitable years ever, it is important that an authoritative, independent voice like Mr. Barofsky's reminds us how the taxpayer bailout of AIG benefited Goldman. ... Regarding his firm's own dealings with AIG, Mr. [Lucas] van Praag said that Goldman believed that its 'exposure was close to zero; because it insulated itself from a downturn in AIG's fortunes through hedges and collateral it had already received. ... So is Janet Tavakoli, an expert in derivatives at Tavakoli Structured Finance, a consulting firm. 'On Sept. 16, 2008, David Viniar, [GSG's] chief financial officer, said that whatever the outcome at AIG, the direct impact of Goldman's credit exposure would be immaterial,' she said. 'That was false. The report states that if the [NYFed] had negotiated concessions Goldman would have suffered a loss.' ... 'The prices of the collateralized debt obligations against which Goldman bought protection from AIG were in sickening free fall, and the cost of replacing AIG's protection would have been sky-high,' she said. 'Goldman must have known this, because it underwrote some of those value-destroying CDO's.' Ms. Tavakoli argues that [GSG] should refund the money it received in the bailout and take back the toxic CDO's now residing on the Fed's books--and to do so before it begins showering bonuses on its taxpayer-protected employees. 'AIG, a sophisticated investor, foolishly took this risk,' she said. 'But the US taxpayer never agreed to be a victim of investment that should undergo a rigorous audit'," my emphasis, Gretchen Morgenson at the NYT, 22 November 2009, link: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/22/business/22gret.html.
The NYFed didn't play "chicken" with Vampire Squid (VS). The correct response was to have VS's executives "shadowed" by FBI agents 24 hours a day. Like what happened to Joe Jett in 1994. I'm sure even Lloyd Antoinette Blankfein would realize if VS had pressed any claims, he would be indicted for something. As Laverntiy Beria said, "Show me the man, and I'll find you the crime", my 16 October 2009 post: http://skepticaltexascpa.blogspot.com/2009/10/which-mob-3.html. Well Mary Schapiro, read this and compare it to VS's claim it was fully hedged and had no AIG exposure. If true, it's because Timmy Boy put $85 billion into AIG. I think Barofksy is close to the truth here. "Improper and criminal"? Fine, VS, The NYFed should have said, "We will put out a press release 9:00 AM tomorrow with your statement. You have until 8:59 AM tomorrow to retract it. What do you want"? Even VS's attorneys could figure out what that meant. Suggestions? Read my 12 and 13 May 6 September 2009 posts: Hey Preet Bharara(PB), can you indict David Viniar (DV) for securities fraud based on his public pronouncements? Look into it. Boy. Or are you on VS's payroll? Here are some of my prior related posts: